





The economics literature generally considers products as points in some characteristics space.
Starting with Hotelling, this served as a convenient assumption, yet with more products being
￿ exible or self-customizable to some degree it makes sense to think that products have positive
measure. I develop a model where ￿rms can o⁄er interval long ￿ fat￿products in the spatial
model of di⁄erentiation. Contrary to the standard results pro￿ts of the ￿rms can decrease with
increased di⁄erentiation - there is a standard e⁄ect of lowering the incentive to cut prices, but
there is also an incentive to provide more content sometimes resulting in lower pro￿ts. Consumer
welfare increases unambiguously with respect to the standard model of Salop. I also ￿nd that
it is pro￿table for ￿rms to commit as an industry not to make fat products. If one ￿rm is a
leader and another is a follower, the leader accommodates the follower by settling for less pro￿ts
if di⁄erentiation is small.
1 Introduction
Harold Hotelling was arguably the ￿rst to introduce product di⁄erentiation. In his model a prod-
uct is a point in the linear space of characteristics. While that model is generally associated with
di⁄erentiation in locations and distances, it is clear from the article that Hotelling had character-
istics space in mind ￿he talks about how his model applies to things from sweetness of cider to
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1political parties￿positions on tari⁄s. Lancaster￿ s work (1971) formally extended the de￿nition of
the product to a point in some characteristics space with many dimensions of di⁄erentiation, while
giving credit to Hotelling for being the pioneer in the ￿eld:
Hotelling had provided a hint as to a possible solution of the product variation
problem by extending his model of pure spatial competition... Hotelling himself did
not develop the idea further, Chamberlin ignored it, and no one else took it up.1
A product is generally de￿ned as follows: "a complete bundle of bene￿ts or satisfactions that
buyers perceive they will obtain if they purchase the product."2 Why should we think of a product as
a point in a characteristics space? Since Hotelling￿ s article, the economic literature has represented
products as points. This has proved to be a useful and convenient assumption that stood the test
of time. The following question arises, however: "why should consumer￿ s utility function be de￿ned
just over points?" A general de￿nition of a product should have utility maps going from a set of
characteristics to the real line. If we want to look at maps that are relatively better behaved,
then we can look at maps of ￿contiguous￿ sets of characteristics ￿intervals in one dimensional
Hotelling space. The cost function of the products can also be a map from the set of the product￿ s
characteristics to the real line. If results turn out to be broadly similar to those using utility
and cost functions de￿ned over points, then we can safely continue using the latter assumption.
Otherwise, more general de￿nitions are needed.
In this article, I examine a straightforward extension of point products to interval-long products
in a one-dimensional spatial model. I refer to these as "fat products". A consumer￿ s utility depends
on whether or not her preferred point is inside the range of the product. If it is, then the consumer
does not need to incur any travel or adjustment costs3. If it is not, then the consumer has to incur
the costs of traveling to the border of the product. As a result, ￿rms can position their product
closer to some consumers without moving away from others. However, such ￿ exibility is costly ￿a
￿rm￿ s cost of developing a product is a convex function of the length (measure) of the product.
I ￿nd that the ￿rms would be willing to collude to make zero measure (point) products, but
in the absence of collusion they develop products of positive measure. Moreover, ￿rms might
1See Lancaster (1971), p. 16
2Wikipedia (English), search query "product".
3I will go on referring to travel or transportation costs throughout the article, although costs of adjustment to a
di⁄erent brand, or a di⁄erent set of characteristics, provides an alternative interpretation.
2incur losses as the degree of di⁄erentiation increases, because while in equilibrium prices rise, the
equilibrium range of the product rises as well, in several instances resulting in an overall drop in
pro￿ts. As a consequence if there is a free entry (or zero pro￿t) condition, this would imply that
as the market grows, or becomes more di⁄erentiated, the number of ￿rms that can survive stays
constant or even decreases, as each ￿rm unilaterally ￿nds it optimal to escalate its R&D spending
and increase the measure of its product.4
I examine an extension, in the spirit of Stackelberg competition, where there are two ￿rms,
and one of them is a leader ￿it picks the price and the size of her product ￿rst. I ￿nd that with
su¢ ciently small development costs the leader picks bigger price and measure than the follower, and
ends up with higher market share and pro￿ts as one would expect. However, the result is reversed
if the development costs are bigger (or the ￿rms are more homogenous) ￿the leader accommodates
the follower by picking a smaller measure than the follower will, and under some conditions even
charging smaller price.
There are several branches of literature close in appearance to Fat Products. One of the most
well-known is bundling. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) examine bundling of many goods, with the
application discussed being distribution of digital goods via internet. The model is built on the law
of large numbers, and the assumption that consumers￿valuations are i.i.d. The outcome is that
bundling a very large number of products can be pro￿table because the ￿rm can just charge the
mean of the distribution. The bundling literature had focused on independently valued products
and occasionally on complements. One of the very few articles on bundling of substitutes is by
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) which ￿nds that if the goods are highly substitutable, it is not a
good idea to bundle to them. The interval-long products in the Hotelling space with each consumer
interested in her ideal point can be viewed as a bundle, however it is a bundle of an uncountable
number of goods (all the points in the Fat Product), where the value of the bundle is the value of
the most valuable good in that bundle.
My model also has some similarity to articles describing the "crowding out" e⁄ect, in particular
to Schmalensee (1978). While the intuition from that article is that incumbents ￿ll up the whole
4This "escalation mechanism" is reminiscent of Sutton (1991). As ￿rms￿willingness to pay for broader products
increases, Sutton￿ s escalation mechanism kicks in. Related to this idea is recent work by Ellickson (2005) looking
at supermarkets as natural oligopolies in terms of making their product o⁄erings broader, the stores larger, and the
aisles wider, therefore not letting in more ￿rms as the market size grows.
3arc of a circle, they do it for deterrence reasons. In my model, where there is no deterrence, ￿rms ￿ll
up intervals to capture more consumers not worrying about potential entrants. The extension with
a leader and a follower has some resemblance to Schmalensee results if the costs of development are
not too high ￿the leader will choose to produce a product of big measure and force the follower
into a market niche. Of course the products are still point products in Schmalensee (1978), which
may make more sense as far as cereal is concerned.
Cheng and Nahm (2006) examine what happens in a vertical di⁄erentiation model when there
is a system of a base product and an add-on which is valueless by itself. As the value of the
base product increases, keeping the value of the system constant the pricing will go from comple-
mentary with the double marginalization problem to independent getting rid of the problem. My
model examines the optimal boundary of products in the horizontal di⁄erentiation framework with
competing symmetric ￿rms.5
2 Applications
Here is how Gerard Debreu describes a product ("commodity") in Theory of Value (1959):
a commodity is therefore de￿ned by speci￿cation of all its physical characteristics,
of its availability date, and of its availability location. As soon as one of these factors
changes, a di⁄erent commodity results.6
Contribution of this article is to think of locations, characteristics, and dates as ranges as
opposed to being points. Location does not have to be a point. A consumer can request a delivery,
and then a product can be at a di⁄erent location without resulting in a di⁄erent product. If delivery
costs the same in some area then wheat in Chicago and wheat in Minneapolis can be thought of as
the same product. A trip on Chicago￿ s Elevated Line costs two dollars no matter if the customer
goes one mile down the line to a store or some twenty miles from Evanston to Hyde Park7. If the
consumer lives far from the end of a line, then she can walk or take a bus from the last stop, which
will require extra expenses ￿just like the fat products model. In fact, any access good can be
5Discussion of other related literature is scattered throughout more relevant (for a speci￿c article) sections.
6Debreu (1959), page 30. Italics are preserved from the original.
7$1.75 with a discount card.
4thought of as a Fat Product. Consumers pay to access the good and pick what they want inside ￿
the applications range from Disneyland to network access to all-you-can-eat bu⁄ets. The measure
of the product is then the extent of the access provided.
Imagine a beach and two vendors selling ice-cream. Instead of being stationary they can walk
around, and the consumers who are not in one of the route intervals (or who are dissatis￿ed with
the price in the route they belong to) can come to the boundary of one of the routes and wait for
the vendor to come by. I am interested in how long are the vendors￿routes, and what price will
they charge. Alternatively, two vendors can be at the opposite ends of the unit interval, deciding
how much extra ground to cover (or maybe to just stay in one place if the optimum is zero)8.
I do not intend the model to just be a spatial model ￿this is a model of product di⁄erentiation.
Think of an o¢ ce chair. One can adjust height up and down in a continuous interval ￿each ￿rm
does not have many lines of otherwise the same o¢ ce chairs, each of a particular height. Think of
how much sugar you put in your co⁄ee for the same price. Sweetness of cider was one of Hotelling￿ s
applications, but if you come to the co⁄ee shop and the sugar is free, then you can continuously
adjust the sweetness to your own taste without paying more. Brightness and focus of a projector
or a TV set, self-customizable products, and all of the above are examples of fat products. The
consumer gets an interval of characteristics in one product, and can pick the one that she wants.
Another example to look at is any software with options. The user can adjust how big is the
window, the size of the font, the color of the letters ￿whatever that software specializes in, but
still the available characteristics to the user are an interval of characteristics (i.e. how wide should
the window of Acrobat Reader be ￿from zero to the width of the screen), for which the user does
not have to pay more.
Lancaster in his book had provided another kind of application for fat products with respect to
characteristics ￿combinable goods.
If goods are combinable, so that two goods can be consumed simultaneously to give
a characteristics collection that is a combination of the characteristics of the separate
goods.... the problem must be approached anew..... In the combinable case, however,
the individual could attain exactly the most-preferred collection of characteristics (that
8Thanks to Shane Greenstein for this example.
5is the collection he or she would obtain from the most-preferred good, if it were available)
by consuming goods Y and Z together.9
The fat products are combinable goods with the goods Y and Z being the endpoints of the
interval, and bundle Y and Z sold by one ￿rm. Imagine buying a cocktail set ￿every consumer
can make their own favorite combination while paying the same price, while the combination can
vary continuously. Alternatively one can mix hot and cold water in the tap to achieve the perfect
temperature. There is already some literature on the combinable goods, started by Anderson and
Neven (1989), who prove that with combinable goods ￿rms end up playing the socially optimal
strategies. The consumers in this literature can buy a bit of both products around them and mix
them together, however these are point products being o⁄ered by di⁄erent ￿rms.10
An example with time for Fat Products is coupons that consumers can use in a given time
period. The coupon does not change if it is used several days before or several days after, and the
length of the product is just the expiration date of the coupon ￿then the value is zero. While the
coupon loses the value after the expiration date, the companies issuing them still have to think
over the length of the period when the coupon might be used.
Stores￿operating hours is a close concept to a fat product ￿the consumer can go to the store
at whatever time the store is opened without having to pay extra fees. Anyone checking in at a
hotel can check in whatever time they want to in a given interval (say, from 4pm). Also operating
hours are easily modeled as one-dimensional and intervals ￿it is hard to imagine a store or a hotel
opening and closing for a few seconds each minute.
Shopping hours literature developed some models close to interval-long products in one dimen-
sional space. The shops are picking the hours when are the stores open and prices. Consumers
have optimal shopping times and incur disutility if they have to move their shopping hours if the
store is closed at a particular time.11 The literature is mainly interested in what happens if the
9Lancaster (1971), p. 56￿ 58.
10The applications of this concept are TV viewing and advertisement, where viewers can see di⁄erent channels in
the same day, and pick the optimal mix for them. Two recent papers on the topic are Gal-Or and Dukes (2003)
arriving at a conclusion that ￿rms prefer to minimally di¢ rentiate their products and Gabszewicz et. al. (2004),
where the authors ￿nd that the less viewers like advertising the closer will the TV stations come to eachother .
11Inderst and Irmen (2005) considers two shops choosing between being opened either at day, at night, never or
always. The result is that there can be some asymmetric hours provision from two ex-ante similar stores. Also, if
shopping hours are regulated, the retailers will charge higher prices and will be better o⁄. Shy and Stenbacka (2006)
considers continuous time intervals, yet keep prices as exogenous, again resulting in the possibility of asymmetric
shopping hours, and in the fact that shops are not opened long enough from the social welfare point of view.
6government regulates the shopping hours, and when is it possible to set asymmetric opening and
closing hours, but while asymmetric distribution of consumers plays a big role in that literature,
this model might still be useful in that context.
3 Monopoly
3.1 The Fat Products Monopolist Model
The model setup closely follows that of Salop, with the important di⁄erences in the parts describing
the production possibilities and costs. The conceivable goods are located along the unit interval.
The consumers are going to be the standard address consumers ￿located uniformly along the unit
circumference circle, with some ￿xed reservation price for the product, say R > 0, and transporta-
tion costs t￿d ￿with d ￿ 0 being the distance between the consumer and the product12, and t ￿ 0
being the marginal cost of transportation. If the consumer has a choice, she is going to buy the
product to maximize U(d)￿p, where p is the price of the product, and U(d) = R￿td. The outside
option￿ s utility is 0.
The monopolist can choose to make products in a form, and with the characteristics of an inter-
val, say [a;b], 0 ￿ a ￿ b ￿ 1, with the development/production cost of a product Cdevelopment([a;b]) =
c(b ￿ a), where c(￿) is a function. I will usually refer to the length of the interval o⁄ered as m13.
The standard measure zero products will be developed/produced with some positive ￿xed cost, so
c(0) = F > 0. Also let c0(0) = 0 to avoid the uninteresting case where the costs are so steep to
expand from a point that no ￿rm will be willing to take them. I will assume throughout the paper
that t > R, i.e. in the simple monopoly case there are consumers who do not buy the good.
3.2 Non-Negative Measure Solution
To make sure that the second order conditions are satis￿ed I make the following assumption14.
Su¢ ciently Convex Cost Assumption (M). Let the cost function c(m) of developing/producing




12or the closest point on the interval in case of the product being an interval
13U for Utility, t for Transportation, R for Reservation, c for Cost and m for Measure
14For an example where this assumption is not satis￿ed (the costs are linear) and consumers are on a unit interval
as opposed to a line see Appendix A. The qualitative results do not change substantially.
7Does this assumption make sense? Since c is a cost function, it should be increasing. This
assumption requires the cost function to be not just convex, but also have the second derivative
bounded away from zero. Since adding an extra " > 0 of measure to the product requires this " to
interact with the rest of the measure already in place, it seems natural to assume that as measure
increases the addition of the same " becomes more and more costly. Now we can move on to the
proof.
Figure 1. Consumers￿utility with a Fat Monopolist.







and makes products with the measure of m￿, such that c0(m￿) = p￿.
Proof. The di⁄erence between the ￿gure above and a standard spatial problem is that before the
net utility (utility less the travel costs) would look like a triangle as opposed to a top of a trapezoid
￿there would be no ￿ at part. The demand remains from the zero measure case, but there is also a
portion added, equal to the length of the Fat Product. Therefore the demand for a given price for











I need to look at the Second Order Conditions to make sure that the function is concave in









5. To ensure concavity the ￿rst leading
principle major needs to be less than zero, and the determinant needs to be positive. The ￿rst
leading major is ￿4=t, and since t > 0 it is negative. Looking at the determinant, we can see that























= p￿ ￿ c0(m￿) = 0 =)
c0(m￿) = p￿. (2)
3.3 Comparing the Results





). The optimal measure is increasing in both R and t, which is intuitive as if the
utility to be extracted from the consumers is high, the monopolist will o⁄er a wider product, and
if the transportation costs are higher, then the incentives to o⁄er a wider product increase.
Note that the condition on the derivative of the cost function is exactly the marginal revenue
equals the marginal cost condition. Increasing the measure by an epsilon increases the demand by
epsilon, and therefore the revenue by epsilon times price. But increasing the measure by an epsilon
costs the derivative of the cost function at the current measure times epsilon.
The prices are higher with a fat product since not only does the ￿rm need to cover the devel-
opment costs, but also now they can extract the full reservation price. The pro￿ts are of course
higher as well, since measure equal to zero option was there for the ￿rm to take. It is not obvious
what happens with the number of the consumers served, and their welfare.










The e⁄ect of Fat Products on consumption is unambiguous - even though the price is going up,
the more of the measure o⁄ered, the more product is going to be sold. It is not as straightforward
for the consumer welfare.




Proof. Consumer welfare is the trapezoid above the price line and below the net utility curve on













Compare this to the consumer welfare with m = 0, which is CW0 =
R2
4t











The result says that as R increases it is easier for the consumer welfare under Fat Products to
be bigger than under the measure 0 case. This happens because all the consumers who are getting
exactly what they want (i.e. located within the product interval) are getting much more utility
than in the standard case even if the price is slightly higher, and increasing R increases all of their
utilities more than it would under the standard case. As for the result in m￿, since the optimal
measure is directly related to price, it is clear that as the measure increases, so does the price,
and the welfare must decrease with respect to the measure 0 case. When the transportation costs
increase, so will the price, as opposed to the standard case, and again the welfare will decrease
comparatively.
Notice that we need the su¢ ciently convex cost assumption to make sure that the SOCs are
satis￿ed, however if the assumption does not hold, the equilibrium might still exist. In the Appendix
A I derive the equilibrium for linear costs of expanding the measure and the customers located at
the unit interval. Both of these make the proof much harder and do not add much intuition to the
result. The results are that if the cost of the expansion is low enough then the monopolist will cover
the whole interval and charge p = R, leaving consumers with 0 welfare. Otherwise the monopolist
goes back to the standard point product.
104 N Firms in Bertrand Competition
4.1 Introduction and Setup
I am going to solve the N ￿rms problem, competing a0 la Bertrand. A given ￿rm will take the prices
and the measures by the other ￿rms as ￿xed. The ￿rms and the consumers will be in a circular
city. For the local analysis I will use three ￿rms on the unit interval ￿with the two ￿xed ￿rms and
the deviant ￿rm, the prices and measures of the ￿xed ￿rms ￿xed and equal. To provide intuition
behind the math, the ￿gure on the next page is provided. To make the matters even simpler, the
reader can view this as a duopoly along the circumference competition ￿since the prices by the
other ￿rms are ￿xed, then it does not matter whether there are two ￿xed one side ￿rms, or one
￿xed ￿rm on both sides.
4.2 Fat Products versus Multi-Products
There is a big literature on Multi-Product ￿rms ￿the ones which can make several products and
price them accordingly15. The reasons not to make many points instead of an interval are ￿xed costs
and economies of scale. Think of the two ice-cream vendors from the application section. Would it
make sense to put dozens of stationary vendors instead? Probably not, because of the ￿xed cost of
hiring each additional vendor. For the same reason, and economies of scale, it would not make much
sense to develop dozens of chairs of di⁄erent heights or several projectors of di⁄erent brightness and
focus which are otherwise the same. The literature on product lines and mass customization moves
in similar direction as the Multi-Product ￿rms literature. The bene￿t of an adjustable good versus
a mass customized line of goods is still in ￿xed costs and economies of scale. Here is an example
to illustrate this point from Zipkin￿ s (2001) discussion on the limits of Mass Customization.
...there was talk of customizing car seats. Toyota even set up a prototype of a seat-
measurement device at its visitor center in Toyota City. It never happened. Instead,
adjustable seats developed rapidly. It is cheaper to construct adjustable seats than to
customize.
15See Spence (1980) for example
11If the ￿xed cost F of producing a point product is high enough, no ￿rm would be willing to
make two of them. The conditions on when does it cost less to produce one fat product or two
endpoints of the product are easily derived16. What happens if the ￿xed costs go to zero, and the
￿rms would prefer to make many point products? Then if there is more than one ￿rm, we have
the result due to Teitz (1968) that there does not exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where
￿rms can choose to produce more than one product with linear travel costs for consumers. I will
examine the oligopoly structure as if there is no option to develop more than one product ￿or that
the ￿xed cost F is high enough.
Think of a belt ￿it has many adjustment positions (holes), but the adjustment is not continuous.
This is not a multi-product o⁄ering. This is a fat product, where instead of an interval, the product
is a set of multiple points. All the results hold the same, except for consumer welfare ￿the consumers
whose favorite position is between two holes of the belt will get less welfare than with an interval.
However, as long as there are a few points inside the interval, these consumers will not be marginal,
therefore many points as one set as opposed to an interval only will matter for quantitative results
on consumer welfare, while all the other results (including qualitative on consumer welfare) will go
through as is now.
4.3 The Fat Products Oligopoly Model
The model setup is almost the same as that of Section 3, except that now there areN ￿rms located
symmetrically around the unit circle, and the products are arcs on the circle. The consumers are
going to be the standard address consumers ￿located uniformly along the unit circumference circle,
with some ￿xed reservation price for the product, say R > 0, and transportation costs t￿d ￿with
d ￿ 0 being the distance between the consumer and the product, and t ￿ R being the marginal
cost of transportation. If the consumer has a choice, she is going to buy the product such that to
maximize U(d) ￿ p, where p is the price of the product, and U(d) = R ￿ t ￿ d.
The producers can choose to make products in a form, and with the characteristics of an interval
(so an arc, since it is a circular city), say [a;b], 0 ￿ a ￿ b ￿ 1, with the development/production cost
of a product C([a;b]) = c(b￿a), where c is a function. I will still refer to the length of the interval
16c(m) < 2F, or equivalently the additional cost of developint a positive length product must be less than the ￿xed
cost.
12o⁄ered as m. The standard measure zero products will be developed/produced at some positive
￿xed cost, so c(0) = F > 0. Before proceeding with the proof, I need the following assumption to
ensure that the second order conditions hold. The implications of the assumptions were discussed
in the monopoly section. Notice that this bound is weaker than the one in the monopoly section,
which makes sense since competition implicitly makes it harder for the ￿rm to expand its￿measure
further.
Su¢ ciently Convex Cost Assumption (N). Let the cost function c(m) of developing/producing




I only focus on pure strategy symmetric Nash Equilibria as the solution concept. Consider what
happens if some consumers are left out of the market.
Lemma 1 (Full Coverage Lemma). The only equilibrium such that there are consumers left out of
the market is the trivial equilibrium where the global monopolist￿ s problem is the same as the local
monopolist￿ s problem.
Proof. See appendix B.
In this case the scaling up of the market is not valid, since as N goes up and everything else
stays constant this equilibrium will eventually disappear, and it will be harder and harder to let
every ￿rm to optimize as if it is unconstrained by the neighbors. From now on I will assume that
the parameters do not lead to the trivial case where a ￿rm can act as a global monopolist, and
move on to the case where there are no consumers are left out of the market.
4.4 No Consumer Left Out
Now that there are no consumers left out, we can use Figure 3 (see below). First, I need to
examine the possibility of a price equals marginal cost equilibrium. The price equal to marginal
cost situation can arise in the case where no consumer is left out if either all the ￿rms produce
measure 1/N products, or if all of them produce measure zero products. In either case, a deviant
￿rm can unilaterally raise its price above zero. This will clearly bring in positive pro￿ts, and so
we can not have a zero pro￿t equilibrium in my model, unless one includes ￿xed costs of entry
in the industry. To make sure that the ￿gure below looks right, I need to show that products of
competing ￿rms do not intersect.
13Lemma 2 There is no symmetric Nash equilibrium where products of two ￿rms intersect.
Proof. See appendix B.
In the main proof below I ￿x all the ￿rms￿measure and prices at the same level, and check
whether a deviant ￿rm has an incentive of moving away from the knife-edge equilibrium where the
local markets just touch, and p￿ > c(m￿).
Figure 2. Oligopoly with Fat Products.
Theorem 2 (The N-Firm Fat Product Competition). In the symmetric Nash equilibrium of N
￿rms capable of o⁄ering fat products, each ￿rm charges p￿ =
t
N




, such that c0(m￿) =
t
2N
(The Optimal Measure Condition).
Proof. (For details the reader is encouraged to look at Appendix B).
Fix the measure and the price of the ￿xed ￿rms at m￿ and p￿, and denote by m and p the
measure and price of the deviant ￿rm with respect to which it is going to maximize its￿pro￿t.
First, I ￿nd the demand function ￿which is determined by the marginal consumer ￿who is at
the intersection of two U(x) functions (on Figure 2 above), one of the consumers buying a deviant
￿rm product, and the other one of the left Fixed ￿rm. Just making the two equal to each other,






, so if the deviant ￿rm lowers the measure of
its￿fat product, m, the intersect point will move to the right, cutting into deviant￿ s market share.
Raising price p has the same e⁄ect. Since the deviant ￿rm competes with two ￿xed ￿rms, one on
each side, the demand for the deviant ￿rm is Ddeviant(m;p) =
1
N
￿2x(m;p), and the pro￿t is then
￿deviant(m;p) = DA(m;p) ￿ p ￿ c(m).
To insure that the Second Order Conditions hold, use the Su¢ ciently Convex Cost assumption.




, and the optimal measure m￿, which, if an interior solution, has to satisfy the Optimal
Measure Condition: c0(m￿) =
t
2N




Then to ￿nd the pro￿t simply substitute the optimal values into the objective function, and the
consumer welfare is N times the area of the trapezoid in the deviant ￿rm region in Figure 2.
Corollary 2 In the symmetric equilibrium each ￿rm will get a pro￿t of ￿+ =
t
N2 ￿ c(m￿), and
the consumer welfare is going to be CW+ =






5 Comparison with Previous Literature
5.1 Summary of the Results
I considered two cases in the previous section. The trivial case equilibrium, with some consumers
left out, happens when the local market optimization is the same as the global one, so the ￿rms
do not have an incentive to deviate even if the ex-post markets are expanded. We get N local
monopolists, with strategies described in Section 3.
In the more interesting case, the market is covered, and the second order conditions are satis￿ed
if the cost function of the measure of the product is su¢ ciently convex. I will focus on this scenario
for the rest of the paper. Prices are the same as in Salop, pro￿ts are lower and consumer welfare
is higher. The measure o⁄ered by ￿rms in equilibrium is sometimes positive, and depends on the
exact form of the cost function. This is intuitive and something that we would expect from the
monopoly results.
155.2 Comparison with Salop
Corollary 3 The equilibrium price is the same, the pro￿ts of the ￿rms are lower, and the consumer
welfare is higher in the Fat Products oligopoly than in the standard oligopoly equilibrium.
To see the results of Salop one can just substitute m = 0 into the results of Theorem 2 ￿the
fat products model is a generalization of Salop￿ s model. The price is the same, which is the most
unexpected result, especially after Theorem 1, where in the monopoly case the price charged was
higher than the standard. The prices remain the same since what determines the prices is the
slopes of the net utility curves at the marginal consumer (the intersection). Those remain the same
as they were in Salop￿ s model. Clearly this result is due to the assumption of linear travel costs.
Pro￿ts are lower since there is the extra cost of providing fat products, while the revenue stays the
same. The consumer welfare went up since in the Salop equilibrium the welfare would just be N
triangles with bases of
1
N
and heights of reservation price less the actual price. Now we have N
trapezoids, and as long as the measure is positive consumer welfare goes up. In the limit case of
measure being equal to one the consumer welfare will double.
The more ￿rms there are in the industry, the overall pro￿ts can actually become higher. Whether
it happens depends on the exact form of the cost function. This possibility arises because the
diseconomies of scale issue in the cost of fat products is becoming less severe as N increases.
If we look at the ￿xed cost, like Salop did, the ￿xed cost in this industry to support a SPZE
(sub-game perfect zero pro￿t Nash equilibrium) would be less than the ones in the original model,
since there is the cost of positive measure that the ￿rms have to pay now that they did not have
to worry about before.
Corollary 4 It would be pro￿table for all the ￿rms in the market to commit to making only m = 0
(standard) products.
Recall the example of two ice-cream vendors. What this corollary means is that they would
rather agree that both of them stand as opposed to walking around and try to appeal to more
consumers. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since the prices and the demand are the
same as in Salop, the revenues are the same as well. However, the ￿rms have to pay extra cost for
making their products fat. There is an arms race which bene￿ts in the end only the customers -
16without the e⁄ects of the competitors the ￿rms would happily make their products fatter, but with
the competitors doing the same, fatter products only help the customers.
What happens to pro￿ts if t goes up, or as the products become more di⁄erentiated? Just
looking at the equation ￿+ =
t
N2 ￿ c(m￿) the immediate reaction is that they necessarily go
up. However m￿ depends on t, and as t goes up, so does m￿. The following numerical example
illustrates an interesting point.
Example 1 Let there be N ￿rms in the city. Let t 2 (6;8) and c(m) = em. Then the su¢ ciently
enough cost condition is satis￿ed (since em ￿ 1 ￿
t
8
for m ￿ 0) and c(0) = 1 > 0. Also let R be




, and therefore c(m￿) =
t
2N
. Also notice that m￿ = ln
t
6
￿ 0. Thus the
pro￿t is ￿+(t;N) =
t










t. With N > 2 this decreases in t!
Therefore with the Fat Products we get the unexpected conclusion that pro￿ts do not neces-
sarily increase as the transportation costs go up! This is a clear di⁄erence from the predictions of
Salop (1979) since there we got a clear conclusion that the pro￿ts will go up as the transportation
costs (di⁄erentiation between the products) go up, since there the pro￿ts per ￿rm were simply
t
N2.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium pro￿ts will go down as the transportation costs go up (￿rms become




Proof. All is needed is the derivative of pro￿ts with respect to t, however ￿rst we need to implicitly




































To see when is pro￿t going down with respect to t we now just need to check when is (4) less than
zero. Since c(￿) is convex by assumption, c00(￿) > 0. Therefore
@￿
@t




17for the N ￿rm part of the paper we just needed to assume that c00(m￿) >
t
8
, therefore the region
where both inequalities are satis￿ed is not empty.
What is the intuition behind this surprising result? In Salop￿ s model the reason that the pro￿ts
go up with the increase in transportation costs is that now the rival ￿rms do not have as much
incentive to lower their prices to undercut, since after undercutting not as many consumers are
going to switch because of the travel costs. This gives the ￿rms the ability to price higher without
fearing the competition.
Once again, recall the example with two ice-cream vendors. Suppose it becomes hotter, so the
travel costs go up for the consumers. Then the vendors become more di⁄erentiated, but the value
of walking closer to a given consumer increases. Therefore under certain conditions the vendors
will do more additional walking than the additional pro￿ts that they will receive due to increased
di⁄erentiation. In this model there are two di⁄erent e⁄ects at play. First one is the one described
above. The second one is that with increase in t expanding the measure of the product becomes
more and more valuable way to attract consumers than it was before. And so instead of competition
in prices, the ￿rms engage in cut-throat competition in content. In equilibrium it is clear that even
though the ￿rms will o⁄er more content, they will still attract the same number of consumers,
therefore with increase in t we have a welfare transfer from ￿rm pro￿ts to consumer welfare.
Why do the pro￿ts not go down with t if the costs are very convex? This happens because if
the costs are too steep they act as a deterrent for ￿rms to increase the measure too much, therefore
this way the ￿rms actually bene￿t from higher costs.
5.3 Comparison with Mass Customization
5.3.1 Setup
Mass customization in operations research is a model is of a base point product in the spatial
model of di⁄erentiation, and a ￿rm that can produce point products close by to the base product
for a higher cost. The ￿rm can charge consumers di⁄erent prices for di⁄erent products. Dewan
et.al. (2003) examines a duopoly with quadratic costs of making products away from the base
product. The main results are that the duopoly would o⁄er less scope of products than a two-
facility monopolist, the prices stay the same as in Salop￿ s model, and that if the ￿rms do not enter
18simultaneously, then the ￿rst entrant always achieves advantage. Mendelson and Parlakturk (2005)
looks at a duopoly with a two stage game ￿in the ￿rst stage the ￿rms decide how much (if at
all) to invest in mass customization, and in the second stage they decide on the pricing structure.
The ￿ndings are that a ￿rm with either quality or cost disadvantage will not want to customize by
itself, and that occasionally even free customization might hurt ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts.
A branch of economics closely related to mass customization is product line competition. This
literature concerns ￿rms which can o⁄er several products for di⁄erent prices. One of the ￿rst e⁄orts
is an insightful article by Klemperer (1992), which results are driven by customers having switching
costs from one brand (or store) to another, and so the ￿rms would try to position their products
next to each other, as opposed to the standard Hotelling intuition. One of the latest e⁄orts is
Draganska and Jain (2005) empirically examining the e⁄ects of extending the product line (i.e.
o⁄ering new ￿ avors of yogurts) when the customers have preference for variety. They ￿nd that the
product line length and price are substitutes from the ￿rm￿ s point of view - if the ￿rm wants to
increase the price and keep the market share constant it should increase the product line as well,
which I ￿nd as well ￿if the ￿rm wants to increase the price, it needs to extend the length of the
interval as well.
I will assume an exact functional form for the cost function and compare the results of the
equilibrium from the previous section to the results obtained by Dewan et.al. for Mass Customiza-
tion. The Mass Customization model has exactly the same setup from the consumers￿side as the
standard Salop and the Fat Products model. The di⁄erence comes on the production side.
In Mass Customization, each ￿rm has a focus point ￿the standard product, and can produce
a tailored product x units away from the focus point for c(x). In that article the authors assume
a duopoly (so N = 2) with quadratic costs, with positive coe¢ cients on x2 and x (which makes it
easy to satisfy the Convex Enough Cost Assumption) and the constant being zero. The price of
the goods listed is the price of the focus good, with the optimal price of a tailored good is the ￿base
price￿of the focus good plus the transportation cost from the focus good to the tailored good (i.e.
if the focus good is at 0 and has a price of 2, a tailored good at 1




o⁄ered scope is the length of the interval where a ￿rm o⁄ers tailored products for any point on that
interval.
For both models to work, I will assume the same cost structure here to make the comparison
19straightforward, and also a technical assumption on the relation of a, b and t for the Mass Cus-
tomization model to produce answers. Firms earn more pro￿ts if they are in the Mass Customized
industry versus a Fat Product industry, and produce a bigger scope of products than the measure
of the Fat Product if the travel costs are su¢ ciently high.
Quadratic Cost Assumption. Let the costs of customization (customizing a product x units
away from the base product) and the costs of developing a product of measure x are the same:
c(x) = ax2 + bx (Therefore c0(x) = 2ax + b, and c00(x) = 2a). Let 6b < t < 4a.
5.3.2 Comparison
Given the same values of parameters (R, t, a and b) I will compare the equilibrium price, measure
and scope, and the pro￿t in the Fat Products model and the Mass Customization model. The
derivations for the Fat Products can be found in Section 4 and the appendix, the derivations for
Mass Customization can be found in Dewan et.al.
The price of base product in the Mass Customization model is the same as the price in the Fat
products model, both t=2. One would expect the prices to go down in both Mass Customization
and the Fat Products models because the ￿rms essentially get closer to each other and are now
more competitive. On the other hand, the consumers have higher welfare, and the ￿rms could
potentially charge higher prices. Neither happens because while pricing for the marginal consumer,
the ￿rms have to remember about the pricing decisions inside the interval, being especially true
for the Fat Products model where the ￿rms can not price discriminate. Moreover, for the Mass
Customization model the base price is t=2, however as the discussion in the previous sub-section
mentioned, the tailored goods are going to be priced at
t
2
+ td, where d is the distance from the
last customized product, therefore the average price paid by a consumer in the Mass Customization
model goes up. Therefore a mis-speci￿cation of the model can lead to overestimation of the actual
price paid.
The scope o⁄ered by the Mass Customization ￿rms is x￿ =
t ￿ 6b
12a ￿ 3t
(this is why the additional




. Therefore we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5 The measure in the Fat Products model is going to be bigger than the scope in the




The cuto⁄ is clearly increasing in both a and b, therefore with increasing costs there is a higher
chance that the Fat Products equilibrium is going to produce a good which more consumers will have
as their optimum. The ￿rms with Mass Customized products can get something from increasing
the scope (proportional to the travel costs), since the consumers who buy the goods inside the
scope will have to pay higher prices. Therefore as travel costs increase the Mass Customizing ￿rms
will o⁄er wider scope than the Fat ￿rms.
The pro￿t under the Fat Products model is ￿+ =
t
N2 ￿ c(m￿). The pro￿t in the Mass Cus-
tomization model is ￿MC =
18(b2 + at) ￿ 5t2
18(4a ￿ t)
.
Corollary 6 The per ￿rm pro￿t in the Fat Products model is going to be always smaller than the
pro￿t in the Mass Customization model. The di⁄erence in pro￿ts is ￿MC￿￿+ =
t(9t2 ￿ 20at ￿ 144b2)
576a(4a ￿ t)
.
The Fat Products scenario is the worst for the ￿rms (and therefore the best for the consumers)
because they have to charge the same price as in the standard case, yet pay up for more measure
than the Mass Customization pay for scope. As the costs (either a or b) go up, the di⁄erence
becomes smaller, yet with the assumptions made in the beginning of this section, the di⁄erence is
going to be positive.
6 Comparison with Benchmarks
6.1 Free Entry
It is interesting to compare what happens with free entry - the limiting case being monopolistic







Corollary 7 The industry would support more ￿rms if the ￿rms could not develop fat products.
The supported number of ￿rms will go down as the ￿rms become more di⁄erentiated under the same
conditions as in Proposition 2.
21The expression above gives us a condition on the optimal N. As F (the ￿xed cost c(0)) goes up,
the optimal N goes down. As t goes up, so does m￿, therefore the e⁄ect of t on N￿ is hard to see.
Similarly to the pro￿t discussion in the section above, higher di⁄erentiation does not necessarily
lead to lower number of ￿rms in monopolistic competition as opposed to the result due to Salop.
We can see immediately from the equations above that if in the absence of free entry ￿rms can
have pro￿ts decreasing in t, then so can the optimal number of ￿rms. The intuition stays the same
as before in the analysis of pro￿ts.
This result, while surprising, had been previously examined at lengths in the literature. The
same mechanism works here as in Sutton￿ s results on endogenous sunk costs. The ￿rms sink more
development costs as the market becomes bigger (or the transportation costs go up), resulting in
lower pro￿ts, and therefore the market cannot accommodate more ￿rms.17
6.2 Comparison with a Social Planner
Following the literature, it is interesting to see what happens when there is a social planner who
is interested in maximizing the total welfare - the sum of consumer welfare and ￿rms￿pro￿ts. The
case of N local monopolists in the market is not optimal since not everyone is getting served,
even though everyone should be because the marginal cost of producing the good is 0 and all the
consumers have positive valuations. In the competitive case as long as the market is covered, it does
not matter for the purposes of total welfare what is the price. Therefore what the social planner
needs to optimize is the total possible welfare (R) less the loss in transportation costs18, less the
loss due to the development of products.










￿ N ￿ c(m)N (6)
Since the maximum welfare possible, R, is ￿xed, the social planner￿ s problem reduces to mini-
mizing the transportation cost loss and the loss due to development of products.
17What are the possible industries where the ￿rms essentially o⁄er fat products and Sutton￿ s results apply? Ellickson
(2005) examined supermarkets as application of endogenous sunk costs. As the market size grows, the supermarkets
o⁄er more product o⁄ering breadth, wider aisles, more check-outs, and so on ￿giving customers new options to use
if they want for the same price.
18The term in the brackets - ￿rst term is height of the triangle above the utility lines and below R line in Figure




t + c(m)N (7)
I will analyze only the social planner who can maximize with respect to either the measure that
each ￿rm produces (m) or the number of ￿rms (N).
Proposition 3 A social planner who optimizes total welfare with respect to the number of ￿rms
would choose less ￿rms than would enter with free entry.





















+ c(m). Since the social planner




















This result supports the long running view in the literature that when there are signi￿cant
business stealing e⁄ects in an industry, there will be too many ￿rms. This is the case here, as since
the market is covered, each new entrant does not create any business but just steals the neighbors￿
consumers. Coupled with the ￿xed cost, this creates the conclusion that there are too many ￿rms
with free entry. The optimal number of ￿rms is not the only thing that the social planner can
a⁄ect, therefore I need to also examine the measure e⁄ects.
Proposition 4 A social planner who optimizes total welfare with respect to the measure of the
product each ￿rm uses, would choose products of lower measure than the ￿rms would have chosen
by themselves.











+Nc00(m). This is always
going to be bigger than zero since both terms are positive by de￿nition of t and the su¢ ciently








Since the optimal measure condition in Theorem 2 was c0(m￿) =
t
2N
and c00(m) > 0, the result
is that msp < m￿.
While one would expect the ￿rms to produce not enough measure, since this greatly helps the
consumer welfare, that does not happen. The same e⁄ect as we have seen in the proposition above
works here as well - the ￿rms in an arms race to see who can deliver the most measure, yet since
everyone will deliver the same in equilibrium the ￿rms end up hurting each other. The cost of the
measure expansion hurts the ￿rms more than it helps the consumers because the ￿rms need not
only to supply whatever the consumers might need, but much more than that to compete with its￿
neighbors.
6.3 Monopolist with N locations
Assume monopolist has N locations symmetrically distributed around the circle. The cost functions
at each location are the same as in oligopoly. If the monopolist chooses not to cover the market,
then this is equivalent to the N monopolists from the Fat Monopoly section. If the monopolist does
cover the market, then it is clear that she will extract all the surplus from the consumers indi⁄erent
between locations ( 1
2N away from a location). This price will therefore be pN
M = R ￿ t( 1
2N ￿ m
2 ).
Lemma 3 Monopolist with N symmetric locations will charge a price of pN
M = R ￿ t
(1￿mN)
2N , and
develop products with the same measure as N competing ￿rms at same locations.
Proof. The price part is presented above ￿if the monopolist covers the market, she has to extract
all the surplus from marginal consumers. The market size is 1, therefore the monopolist has to
optimize the price less development costs with respect to measure at each location. The pro￿t
function, and the derivative with respect to m is thus









24From the FOC we get c0(m) = t
2N ￿exactly the same condition as before.
This comparison illustrates that the result of ￿rms being worse o⁄ with fat products is not due
to the fact that by creating fatter products the industry does not capture new consumers. The
monopolist does not capture new consumers either, yet she is still willing to invest as much as the
N ￿rms who were losing money by developing fat products.
7 Relaxing Linear Transportation Costs Assumption19
Linear transportation costs for the customers is an assumption made throughout the literature on
spatial models. However it is not clear why should that assumption be close to reality even for
simple applications of spatial models, where the transportation costs actually represent the physical
costs of going from one place to another, let alone applications where the costs represent how far
away is the product from the customer￿ s ideal product in some characteristics space. Even with
physical transportation costs, there is an area where the customer can just walk, then there might
be an area covered by the public transportation system, and so on, and there is no reason for the
costs to vary linearly within each of the areas.
It would be a major drawback of the model if the reason why I get the interesting results is
because of the linear transportation costs. Therefore it would be natural to assume some trans-
portation costs function t(d), where d is the distance from the customer to the product o⁄ered by
a ￿rm and t(￿) is a strictly increasing di⁄erentiable function, with t(0) = 0. For simplicity, assume
that the ￿rms are in the equilibrium where all the consumers are served and that the pro￿t function
is concave in the price and measure of the product.
Proposition 5 With transportation costs a function t(￿), in the symmetric equilibrium ￿rms￿













Proof. The full proof is in the appendix. It follows the proof of the Theorem 2, except that now
transportation costs are a function t(￿).
I have derived the optimal price and measure, however the interesting results were what happens
with the measure if the ￿rms can restrict themselves, and what happens with the pro￿ts as the
19Thanks to Michael Whinston for raising this issue.
25transportation costs go up.
Proposition 6 It would be pro￿table for all the ￿rms in the market to commit to making only













< c(m￿)N2. In particular, this
is satis￿ed if the transportation cost function t(￿) is convex.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of the previous proposition, we can derive the optimal price if the





N . Therefore, it is pro￿table
for the ￿rms to sign a stand still agreement with respect to measure i⁄ the pro￿t with m = 0 is














Since the left hand side is bigger than zero, and m￿ > 0, then if t0(￿) is an increasing function, the
right hand side is less than zero, and so the inequality is satis￿ed.
While this condition is not as clear as the one from corollary 4, where this was always satis￿ed,
there is still a wide range of values where this condition holds. Clearly, as the transportation costs
become more and more steep, the ￿rms have to invest more and more into the cost of making fat
products, giving us the result. However, if the transportation costs are su¢ ciently concave, then an
increase in the optimal measure takes the marginal customer lower along the transportation cost
function and allows the ￿rms to charge a higher price.
As the transportation costs are now a function, to make comparative statics, I will look at
transportation costs ￿ ￿ t(￿), at ￿ = 1, and see how does increasing ￿ e⁄ect the ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
Proposition 7 In equilibrium pro￿ts will go down as the transportation costs go up (￿rms become










Proof. The proof is in the appendix. It consists of di⁄erentiating the pro￿t function with respect
to ￿.
Again, we get the conclusion that it is possible to get pro￿ts going down as the ￿rms become




, and of course with linear costs t is the derivative. Overall, it is clear from this
section that linear travel costs assumption was not necessary to achieve any of the results.
8 Fat Products with a Leader and a Follower
With any capacity or investment related problem an interesting question presents itself ￿what would
happen in a Stackelberg setup. I examine what will be the optimal strategies of the ￿rms if there
are two ￿rms in the market with the leader picking the price and the measure ￿rst, and the follower
picking its￿ price and measure conditioning on the leader￿ s choice. In the mass customization
literature the result of a Stackelberg competition is that the leader will expand the scope of o⁄erings
more than in the standard duopoly to force the follower to produce less.20 While Schmalensee (1978)
did not explicitly look at a Stackelberg-type model in his seminal work in entry deterrence, one
could view it as such since the incumbents had a chance to expand their product line. Judd (1985)
later showed that the model sometimes does not lead to excessive entry by incumbents if the exit
option is available to the incumbent. To make the predictions more clear I will disregard the
possibility that a big enough measure of the leader might make the follower not enter at all, and
look at the case where both the leader and the follower will produce the good. Therefore the two
variables of interest are prices and measures of the ￿rms.
Assume there are two ￿rms a leader (L) and a follower (F). Firm L picks mL and pL ￿rst, and
then ￿rm F picks mF and pF. The cost of Fat Product development for each ￿rm is c(m) = F+am2,
where F > 0 are ￿xed costs and a > 0.21
Proposition 8 In a Stackelberg game with Fat Products, Leader charges pL =
t(16a ￿ t)(12a ￿ t)
8a(32a ￿ 3t)
and makes a product of mL =
t(12a ￿ t)
4a(32a ￿ 3t)
. Follower charges pF =
t(20a ￿ 2t)
32a ￿ 3t
, and makes a




Proof. The proof is a standard Stackelberg procedure presented in the appendix.
The two main results are that the prices and the measures o⁄ered by the leader and the follower
are generally di⁄erent. Intuition from previous models leads to a belief that the measure of the
20See Dewan et. al. (2003)
21Similarily to the earlier sections, I need to make an assumption on the second derivative of the cost function to
make sure that the second order conditions are satis￿ed. Now the assumption is a >
t
10.
27leader will be bigger than in the standard model, and the measure of the follower smaller, with
the prices comparison being more ambiguous, but generally price of the leader being bigger than
the price of the follower. The following two corollaries examine the price and measure comparisons
between the leader and the follower.
Corollary 8 The leader develops a product of a bigger measure if the development costs are low
enough (t > 8a). Otherwise the follower develops a product of a bigger measure.
Corollary 9 The leader will charge a higher price unless t 2 [4a;8a]. If the travel costs are within
this range, then the follower￿ s price is higher.
Both of the results are interesting in their own right. The result about measures is that if the
di⁄erentiation is big enough then the leader will use the standard Stackelberg intuition and develop
products of bigger measure and force the follower into a niche. However when the products are more
homogeneous, then the leader is better o⁄ taking the niche strategy for herself. This is consistent
with the basic Fat Products model where if the product di⁄erentiation is not big enough, the ￿rms
might be worse o⁄ developing a product of a bigger measure22.
The corollary on prices shows that the prices exhibit an unusual behavior, where there is an
interval over which the follower￿ s price is higher. This can be viewed as accommodating the follower.
As the products become more homogenous than in the accommodating interval, the leader will
continue to underdevelop its￿good, but charge higher prices to capture more pro￿ts, as eventhough
the follower will undercut, there will still be enough pro￿t for the leader. As the products become
more di⁄erentiated than in the interval, the leader stops accommodating on measure and on price,
as one would expect from the intuition of previous models.
Corollary 10 The market share and the pro￿t of the leader will be higher than that of the follower
if and only if t > 8a.
The corollary above is expected after the previous two, and the intuition stays the same ￿as
the goods become more di⁄erentiated the leader will use standard Stackelberg in capacity intuition.
She will overdevelop the product and force the follower into a market niche, trying to undercut the




4 condition from the corollary, since here
c = am
2 + F, and so c
00 = 2a.
28leader, but still ending up with less than a half of the market share. As the products become more
homogenous the result of the basic model kicks in where the ￿rms are better o⁄ not producing
that much, and then the leader is forced into a niche developing a product of smaller measure and
sometimes even charging less for it.
9 Conclusion
The discussion introduces the notion of fat products ￿products that are sets in the characteristic
space as opposed to points. I have looked at an application of this idea to single dimension spatial
model of Salop, and let products be intervals. I found, among other things, that contrary to the
standard intuition, increasing travel costs can lead to lower pro￿ts in equilibrium. Also the equi-
librium number of ￿rms with free entry might go down as well as ￿rms become more di⁄erentiated.
Based on the results derived in the article, I ￿nd that the assumption of products as points has
drawbacks and may lead to not representative results.
Making ￿rms more di⁄erentiated might in fact lower pro￿ts, if the cost function is not too
convex, because the optimal length of the interval goes up with the transportation costs. The
result is due to two o⁄setting e⁄ects. First is the same as in Salop - as transportation costs increase
the ￿rms have less incentive to undercut competitors. On the other hand with positive measure
products the ￿rms will have more incentive to expand their measure. But since in equilibrium
everyone will do that, this expansion just increases the costs without increasing the revenue. Also,
if the ￿rms could restrict themselves to producing only the standard, measure zero products, they
would do that, since the revenues with fat products is the same as in the standard Salop model,
yet they have to pay for the fat product development.
I also examine free entry and social planner￿ s decisions. Since I already have the unexpected
result of increase in transportation costs lowering the pro￿ts, I also derive that an increase in
transportation costs might lead to a lower optimal number of ￿rms in the industry with ￿xed costs,
which mirrors the results of Sutton, but goes contrary to the point model of Salop. The social
planner would have chosen fewer ￿rms each producing products of smaller measure than under free
entry. This con￿rms the standard intuition that when there is the customer stealing e⁄ect with
￿xed costs the number of ￿rms is too big as compared to the social welfare optimum. Also while
29the longer products help consumers, they hurt the ￿rms more.
I also check whether the ￿ndings above hold up when the transportation costs are not linear,
but rather any strictly increasing function. The price will not stay the same, but there are still
the o⁄setting e⁄ects on pro￿ts, and a range of parameters where the pro￿ts will go down with
transportation costs going up. Overall, most of the results go through with a general transportation
function.
If one ￿rm is a leader in setting price and length of the product, the result is similar to the base
model ￿with high enough di⁄erentiation the standard intuition of developing a product with more
measure and forcing the follower to develop a smaller product applies. But high development costs
force the leader into accommodating the follower and even receiving less market share and pro￿ts
than the follower. This extension shows that the idea of Fat Products is applicable to a broader
set of problems, for example, the ￿rms can be asymmetric. Even without asymmetry there are
many other avenues to consider ￿￿rms changing locations, consumers valuing Fat Product more
than just the maximum of the points inside, possible mixed strategy equilibria where the intervals
could intersect ￿the list goes on. However, in this paper I chose to focus on the most interesting
extensions and leave others for future research.
30Appendix
A Bounded Interval and Linear Costs
I prove the Monopolist Theorem under linear development cost assumption and a bounded interval.
Let the measure cost function C([a;b]) = CM ￿(b￿a), where CM is a positive constant. The proof
is a simple two step procedure, where in the ￿rst step the optimal p is found for a ￿xed m = M,
and then I maximize with respect to m. The complications arise since the SOCs are not satis￿ed,
and the pro￿t function is a piecewise function ￿a convex parabola until a cuto⁄ after which the
function is linear.
Theorem 3 (Fat Product Monopolist). A monopolist who has the ability to o⁄er a Fat Product




monopolist will o⁄er a standard point product for p￿ = R
2 .
Proof. First I Calculate the optimal price for a given measure. The demand is D(p) = M +
2(R ￿ p)
t
, and therefore the problem is the following (since there are no production costs, and the













￿ p2 + (M + 2R
t ) ￿ p
2
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￿p + R ￿ 0














￿ p + 1 ￿ M ￿
2R
t
) ￿ ￿1 = 0 (12b)
(￿p + R) ￿ ￿2 = 0 (12c)
￿1;￿2 ￿ 0 (12d)
Consider what happens when ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 0. We get p = mt+2R













+ R, then from the ￿rst condition we get: ￿1 = ￿t +
Mt
2
+ R. The revenue








Consider ￿2 > 0 and ￿1 = 0. From the third condition on the Kuhn-Tucker points we get
p = R. Then from the ￿rst condition we get ￿2 = M ￿
2R
t




. In this case the demand will just be M, and so the revenue will be RM.
Consider ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 > 0. From the third condition on the Kuhn-Tucker points we get
p = R. Plugging this into the second condition we get M = 1. In this case the revenue is R.
Now that we have bounds on M for both case 2 and case 3, and since we know that the cases






and for case 3:
2R
t
< M < 2 ￿
2R
t
. Therefore, if 2R > t then case 2 will happen, and case 3 can not happen, and
the opposite if 2R < t, and if 2R = t, neither of them can happen. Also notice that as M goes to
1, both case 2 and case 3 solutions go to case 4, and if 2R = t, then case 1 solution goes to case 4
as well. Therefore we do not need to worry about case 4 being a special case. Overall, in the next
32step we will have to worry about three scenarios, here is the summary:
Condition 2R = t 2R > t 2R < t





















+ R p = R
.
Now we need to calculate the optimal measure given the price. I proceed by examining each
of the cases above. Consider 2R = t ￿rst. Then, ￿+(m) =
(mt+2R)2
8t ￿ Cm ￿ m, which is clearly a
convex parabola in m. Therefore the minimum lies at one of the endpoints, therefore we just need
to compare pro￿ts. R ￿ Cm ￿ R2




then it is optimal to have m = 1, and p = R. Pro￿t is then R ￿ Cm, and the consumer welfare is
clearly zero. Otherwise the optimum is m = 0, and we get back to the Lemma 1 solution.
For 2R > t scenario the pro￿t function is the same until the switch point, so let￿ s assume that the
optimal solution on that interval is the switch point (since the function is convex), and then compare
the answers to R2
2t . This gives us ￿+(2 ￿ 2R
t ) =
(2t￿2R+2R)2
8t ￿ Cm ￿ (2 ￿ 2R
t ). After the switching
point the pro￿t function becomes price ￿cost, so the switch point falls under this de￿nition as well.
The derivative of pro￿t w.r.t. m becomes t
2 ￿Cm. Therefore if t ￿ 2Cm then the optimal solution is
m = 1, p = R. Let￿ s compare it with m = 0 solution. Again, we get if Cm ￿ R￿ R2
2t , then m = 1 is
optimal, and otherwise m = 0. If t < 2Cm then m = 2￿ 2R
t , and p = t=2. Demand in this case will
be 1, and so the pro￿t will be t
2 ￿Cm￿(2￿ 2R
t ). Let￿ s compare this with the pro￿t from the m = 0
case. So for the measure to be positive, t
2￿Cm￿(2￿ 2R
t ) =) Cm￿(2￿ 2R
t ) ￿ t2￿R2
2t =) Cm ￿ t+R
4 .
However, since R < t < 2Cm, we get Cm ￿ t+R
4 < 2t
4 < Cm, meaning that the ￿rst inequality never
holds, so this sub case never occurs. Otherwise we go back to Lemma 1.
For the last, 2R < t, scenario, the same thing happens as above before the switch point, and
then after the switch point we get the pro￿t function equal to (RM ￿ cost), with the switching
point following this de￿nition as well, so the derivative w.r.t. m becomes R ￿ Cm: If R ￿ Cm,
then the optimal solution is M = 1, p = R, so the comparison with m = 0 is routine by now: we
get if Cm ￿ R ￿ R2
2t , then m = 1 is optimal, and otherwise m = 0. If R < Cm then M = 2R
t ,
p = R. Demand in this case will be M, and so the pro￿t will be
2R(R￿Cm)
t , and the consumer




2t =) 4R2 ￿ 4RCm ￿ R2 =) Cm ￿ 3R
4 for the measure to be positive.
B Proofs from the text
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Suppose the equilibrium prices and measures are such that there are intervals of consumers
who do not buy from either of the ￿rms next to them. Then, e⁄ectively, the deviant ￿rm￿ s market
share increases to include the ￿ left-out￿consumers ￿the demand that it has now, plus the two
intervals of the consumers on either side of that demand. This gives the local market of more than
1/N, since half of the left-out consumers came from the 1/N￿ s of the ￿xed ￿rms.
Whatever was optimal before in the local market for the deviant ￿rm will not be optimal in the
ex-post market for this ￿rm, which now includes the consumers that the Left and the Right ￿xed
￿rms had implicitly left out. The deviant ￿rm will now optimize with respect to both price and
the length of its￿product on its￿new local market, and the equilibrium will be violated, as a bigger
measure of the interval and/or a higher price is going to be optimal now.
The only case where this does not make a di⁄erence to the optimization solution is when the
local market monopoly solution is the same as the monopoly solution. This will happen if the
development or the transportation costs are too high, so that the demand of the optimal monopoly
price is less than 1/N. Then the deviant ￿rm will not want to change its measure and the price,
and so each ￿rm will remain in a Bertrand - Nash Equilibrium, acting as a global monopolist in
each of the local markets.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Suppose that the intervals did intersect. Then there would be a positive measure of
consumers who can be captured by decreasing the price by " > 0. Bertrand intuition applies and
prices go to marginal cost of making one more product, which is 0, and the revenues go there as
well. But then the ￿rms would be better o⁄ deviating to making point products, since they still
get as much revenue, but don￿ t have to pay a big development cost of c(m).
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. In this appendix I derive step-by-step the N-Firm Equilibrium with no consumers left out.
34I will start with the derivation of the point x ￿the intersection of two utility functions, one for the
deviant ￿rm￿ s product, the other for the ￿xed product. Deviant chooses m and p, and m￿ and p￿
stay ￿xed for the ￿xed ￿rms.
































therefore the pro￿t is, with the conditions that both m and p are non-negative.





























































To ensure concavity the Hessian needs to be negative semi-de￿nite, and so the ￿rst leading principle
major needs to be less than zero, and the second, the determinant, needs to be positive. The ￿rst





















, and ￿+ =
t
N2 ￿ c(m￿). There is no development cost (except for the ￿xed
costs) for the original Salop model ￿rms, and their pro￿t looks like this as well, therefore the pro￿t
went down for the ￿rms. Notice that such m is unique, since the total cost function must be
convex, and so the ￿rst derivative is strictly increasing. Consumer welfare is N times the area of
the trapezoid in the center on Figure 2, which becomes
CW = N ￿
D(m￿;p￿) + m￿
2









23Di⁄erentiating again we get
36where m￿ satis￿es the Optimal Measure Condition. We can not see what happens with the total
welfare without functional forms for the cost functions, but since the price is the same as it was in
the original Salop model, and m￿ is non-negative, we can say that the consumer welfare increased.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. I examine two ￿rms, one with base at 0, which will have a product of measure m and
charge p for it, and the other one located at
1
N
, with the product of measure m￿, charging p￿
for it - set up analogous to the one in the proof of Theorem 2. Consider a customer located at x
between the two ￿rms. Then the customer￿ s utility from buying the two products are, respectively,
R ￿ t(x ￿
m
2






￿ x) ￿ p￿. To ￿nd out the customer indi⁄erent between the
two products, just make the two utilities equal, and simplify to get










Assuming the other neighbor is also playing m￿ and p￿, the demand for ￿rm at 0 is 2x￿. Therefore
the pro￿t of this ￿rm will be ￿(p;m) = 2x￿ ￿ p ￿ c(m). Then, implicitly di⁄erentiating equation





































Now we can take look at the ￿rst order conditions of the pro￿t function:
@￿
@p









￿ c0(m) = 0. (26b)







￿ x￿) = t(x￿ ￿
m
2
), and therefore x￿ =
1
2N
















Again, if this m is bigger than
1
N
than the ￿rms end up playing the standard Bertrand, going down
to marginal costs. However then the ￿rms will have a pro￿table deviation to m = 0, and therefore
there will be no symmetric equilibrium in this case.
Proof of Proposition 7.



















N2 ￿ c(m￿). Before we di⁄erentiate
it with respect to ￿, we have to derive @m￿
@￿ ￿rst. We will do it implicitly from the combination of










































































































































A necessary condition for this inequality to hold is that the denominator has to be positive, since











Proof of Proposition 8.
Proof. The game is equivalent to the one where the ￿rms and the consumers are on a Hotelling
half-unit interval, with L located at 0 and F located at 1
2, with doubled payo⁄s and cost of double




UL(x) = R ￿ (x ￿
mL
2
)t ￿ pL, (33a)






￿ x)t ￿ pF. (33b)
Make the two equal to compute demand for both the leader and the follower. Notice that demand
















































= ￿2a, and @2￿F
@mF@pF = 1
2.
39Therefore for the Second Order Conditions to be satis￿ed we need
16a > t. (36)
Assume that this condition on a holds. From 35b we get mF =
pF
4a
. Substitute this back into 35a,




(t ￿ tmL + 2pL). (37)




















t ￿ tmL + 2pL
2(16a ￿ t)
. (38)
































Notice that demands can be expressed as





















= ￿2a, and @2￿L
@mL@pL =
4a
16a￿t. Therefore for the Second Order Conditions to be satis￿ed we need
32a > 3t. (41)
Notice that 41 implies the SOC for the follower (36). We can now examine the First Order Condi-
tions. From 39b we have mL =
2pL
16a ￿ t
. Substitute this into 39a, and set the expression equal to
40zero to get
pL =
















Proof of Corollary 8.





t > 8a. (44)
Proof of Corollary 9.





(t ￿ 8a)(t ￿ 4a) > 0. (45)
Proof of Corollary 10.
Proof. It can be shown that DL > 1





t > 8a. (46)
From the previous derivations we know that





































Therefore for the leader to earn more the following condition must hold:
(t ￿ 8a)(t ￿ (16 + 4
p
2)a)(t ￿ (16 ￿ 4
p
2)a) > 0. (49)
Since a > t
10 by assumption, both second and third term are always negative, therefore the leader
earns more i⁄ t > 8a.
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